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11 Introduction
The strand of literature on economic growth and climate change mostly contains optimiza-
tion models (see for instance Edenhofer et al., 2005, Bosetti et al., 2006, Edenhofer et al.,
2006, Gerlagh, 2006, Laurent-Lucchetti and Leach, 2006, Popp, 2004 and 2006-a). Those
models generally do not study the equilibrium in a decentralized economy1. However, this
aspect is crucial to measure the impacts of economic policies, such as environmental taxes,
pollution permits, research subsidies... The models mentioned above also lack some insights
as for the channels of ￿nancing the innovations in the energy sector and the discrepancy
between the private investment decision and the socially desirable amounts (K￿hler et al.,
2006).
The objective of this paper is to complete this literature by setting up a global analysis,
i.e. a general equilibrium analysis, that includes explicitly both the optimal outcome and
the decentralized equilibrium in a systematic way. The main di￿culty of this exercise lies
in the introduction and the characterization of a speci￿c market for knowledge, together
with its associated prices since in the models mentioned above, knowledge is not directly
embodied in intermediate goods as it is the case in standard endogenous growth theory
(Aghion and Howitt, 1998).
Based on Grimaud and Rouge (2005), we thus propose a method that consists in two
points. First, we de￿ne the optimal price of one unit of speci￿c knowledge (associated
with the energy or backstop R&D sectors) as the sum of the marginal pro￿tabilities of this
unit in each sector using this speci￿c knowledge. Second, by referring to several empirical
studies (see for instance Jones, 1995, Jones and Williams, 1998, or Popp, 2004, 2006-a),
we assume that, in the decentralized economy, the equilibrium price of knowledge is in fact
equal to a given proportion of this optimal value (i.e. usually from a quarter to a third).
With this respect, we have to consider two types of market failures: the pollution from
fossil resource consumption and the research spillovers. That is why, in the decentralized
equilibrium, we introduce two economic policy instruments in a accordance: a tax on the
fossil fuel use and a research subsidy for each R&D sector. To each vector of instruments,
there is an associated equilibrium, which allows to study the impact of one or several policy
1For instance, as Edenhofer et al. put in about their MIND model: ￿Therefore, designing a general
intertemporal equilibrium version of MIND for a comparison with the social planner solution would be the
natural next step￿.
2changes on the equilibrium trajectories. Clearly, when public instruments are optimally
set, the equilibrium of the decentralized economy coincides with the ￿rst best optimum.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and de-
scribes the analytical speci￿cations used for numerical computations. In section 3, we
determine the optimal solutions through ￿ve characterizing conditions and we give some
numerical illustrations of the optimal values. Section 4 studies the decentralized economy.
We ￿rst analyze the behavior of each agent in the economy. Next, we characterize the
equilibrium solutions through ￿ve conditions and we compute analytically the equilibrium
prices, for any policy levels. Finally, we show in a short methodological note how to solve
the decentralized equilibrium as a single maximization problem, which is necessary to solve
numerically the model. In section 5, we implement the ￿rst best optimum by comparing
the two corresponding sets of characterizing conditions, which allows us to determine the
optimal policies. We also illustrate the price paths that implement the optimum. We
brie￿y conclude in section 6.
2 Model setup
2.1 The model
We consider an economy in which, at each time t, a quantity Qt of a homogeneous good is
produced according to the following technology:
Qt = Q(Kt;Et;Lt;At); (1)
where Kt is the amount of physical capital used within the production process, Et is the
￿ow of energy services, Lt, Lt ´ L0e
R t
0 gL;sds, denotes labor and At, At ´ A0e
R t
0 gA;sds, is
an e￿ciency index that measures the total productivity of factors. Growth rates gL;t and
gA;t are exogenously given. Since, as we will see later, climate change a￿ects global income
and not utility, Qt is in fact the ￿nal output that we would get without any environmental
damage. Function Q(:) is assumed to be increasing and concave in each argument and
exhibits constant return to scale. We will denote by QK and QE the marginal productivities
of capital and energy. More generally, ªX will stand for the partial derivative of function
ª(:) with respect to X and, when it applies, for the marginal productivity of input X.
As in the ENTICE-BR model (Popp, 2006), production of energy services requires some
3speci￿c knowledge HE;t, fossil fuels Ft and a backstop energy source Bt:
Et = E(HE;t;Ft;Bt): (2)
We assume that function E(:) is increasing and concave in each argument and that backstop
and fossil fuel are imperfect substitutes. In (2), HE represents technological improvements
into overall energy production process, in the form of energy e￿ciency improvements.
The fossil fuel end product is obtained from some carbon-based non-renewable resource
and some speci￿c investment2:
Ft = F(QF;t;Zt); (3)
where QF;t is the amount of ￿nal product devoted to the production of fossil fuel and
Zt, Zt =
R t
0 Fsds, is the cumulative extraction of the exhaustible resource since the initial
date up to t. Function F(:) is assumed to be increasing and concave in QF, decreasing
and convex in Z. Let ¹ Z be the maximum extractive fossil fuels, which implies Zt · ¹ Z,
8t ¸ 0.3.
The backstop resource is produced from speci￿c investment and knowledge4:
Bt = B(QB;t;HB;t); (4)
where QB;t is the amount of ￿nal product that is devoted to the backstop production sector
and HB;t is the stock of knowledge pertaining to the backstop.
In this model, there are two stocks of knowledge, HE and HB, each associated with a
speci￿c R&D sector (i.e. the energy and the backstop ones). We now specify the dynamics
of these two stocks. In the energy (resp. the backstop) R&D sector, we consider that each
2An appreciable di￿erence with the DICE stream of models lies in the de￿nition of such a production
function which, in fact, replaces the cost (or price) function of the fossil fuel. In Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)
or in Popp (2004) and (2006), such a full cost function is equal to the full extraction cost augmented by
the scarcity rent that depends on Zt. By making this transformation, this utility/technology canonical
model allows for an endogenous determination of the resource market price when solving the equilibrium
(see section 4 below). However, we will analytically specify function F(:) in such a way that there exists a
correspondence with the cost function mentioned below and such that the calibration of the DICE model
still applies.
3Here, the capacity constraint of the exhaustible resource is not characterized by the limited capac-
ity of initial stocks, but by the decreasing relationship between the ￿ow of produced fossil fuel and the
amount of resource that has already been extracted. Put di￿erently, resource scarcity is not physically
but economically captured since the feasibility of fossil fuel production diminishes as the resource is being
extracted.
4The same remark as the one formulated for the fossil fuel production function applies, i.e. the backstop
price as de￿ned in the ENTICE-BR model is here replaced by a production function.
4innovation is a public, indivisible and in￿nitely durable good which is simultaneously used
by the energy (resp. backstop) production section and by the R&D sector in question.
Formally, it is a point on the segment [0;HE;t] (resp. [0;HB;t]). At each time t, the stock
of knowledge in sector i, i = fE;Bg, evolves as follows:
_ Hi;t = Hi(Ri;t;Hi;t); (5)
where Ri;t is the R&D investment into sector i, i.e. the amount of ￿nal output that is
devoted to R&D sector i. The innovation function Hi(:) is assumed to be increasing and
concave in each argument. Then, Hi;t increases due to increase in R&D e￿ort and in
accumulated knowledge, but there are diminishing returns to research over time.
Pollution is generated by the production of fossil fuel, i.e. by the use of the non-
renewable resource. Let ® be the unitary carbon content of fossil fuel such that, without
any abatement policy, the carbon ￿ow released into the atmosphere would be equal to ®Ft.
Let G0 be the stock of carbon in the atmosphere at the beginning of the planning period,
Gt the stock at time t and ³, ³ > 0, the natural rate of decay, so that5:
_ Gt = ®Ft ¡ ³Gt: (6)
As in the DICE model (see also Farzin and Tahvonen, 1996), the atmospheric carbon
concentration does not directly enter the damage function. In fact, increases in carbon con-
centration drives the global mean temperature away from a given state ￿ here the 1990 level
￿ and the di￿erence between this state and the present global mean temperature should
be taken as an index of climate change. Let Tt denote this di￿erence, whose dynamics is
governed by the following state equation:
_ Tt = m1©(Gt) ¡ m2Tt; (7)
where ©(:) is an increasing and concave function that links the atmospheric carbon con-
centration to the dynamics of temperature (i.e. the radiative forcing as characterized in
5In the analytical treatment of the model, we assume for expositional clarity that the emission and
natural decay rates are constant, despite what the DICE model recommends. However, in the numerical
simulations we adopt the climatic equations from DICE, that aims at characterizing the carbon cycle
between oceans and atmosphere as well as the relationship between carbon concentration in the atmosphere,
atmospheric temperature and lower ocean temperature. Based on Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Goulder
and Mathai (2000) estimate parameters ® and ¯ that take into account the inertia of the climatic system.
They state that only 64% of current emissions actually contribute to the augmentation of atmospheric C02
and that the portion of current CO2 concentration in excess is removed naturally at a rate of 0.8% per
year.
5Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000) and m1, m2, are constant positive parameters6.
We denote by g(Tt) the instantaneous unitary damage. This damage a￿ects society
through the global income Yt. Then, the ￿nal output when taking into account climate
change e￿ects is:
Yt = g(Tt) £ Qt; (8)
where g(:) is a strictly concave inverted U-shaped function. As a consequence, as the global
mean temperature increases, the unitary environmental damage ￿rst grows until it reaches
a peak and next, it diminishes.
All the ￿nal output is devoted to either aggregated consumption Ct, fossil fuel produc-
tion QF;t, backstop production QB;t, investment in physical capital It or in the two R&D
sectors RE;t and RB;t:
Yt = Ct + QF;t + QB;t + It + RE;t + RB;t; (9)
together with the dynamic equation of the physical capital stock:
_ Kt = It ¡ ±Kt; (10)
where ±, ± > 0 is the capital depreciation rate.












where ½t is the instantaneous social rate of time preferences, U(Ct) is the instantaneous
utility function from aggregated consumption, ct ´ Ct=Lt is the per capita consumption
and u(ct) is the per capita instantaneous utility function. As usually, functions U(:) and
u(:) are increasing, concave and satisfy Inada conditions.
The model is summarized in ￿gure 1 below.
6As for the dynamics of the atmospheric carbon stock, the state equation (7) replaces in fact a more
complex and general set of dynamic equations which considers two measures of temperature ￿ the atmo-
spheric temperature and the lower oceanic one ￿ and the interactions between both. Kriegler and Bruckner
(2004) have recourse to such a simpli￿ed dynamics by using ￿rst a log function for © and second, by es-
timating corresponding parameters m1 and m2. However, for numeric simulations, we keep the DICE
formulation that describes temperature changes.
6Figure 1: Description of the model
2.2 Analytical speci￿cation and calibration of the model
To characterize analytically our model, we use a mix of functional forms considered in the
DICE and ENTICE-BR models:
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where O(t) = ²3t ¡ ²4 for t < ¹ t, O(t) = ²5 otherwise, ²i > 0, i = 1;5.
7We also consider the following production functions:
F(QF;Z) =
QF
cF + ®F £ (Z= ¹ Z)´F ; with cF;®F;´F > 0





; with ®B;´B > 0:
For numerical computations, we use the same values of exogenous parameters than
in the ENTICE-BR model 7. Since we have transformed the cost functions of fossil fuel
and backstop into production functions, we also specify parameters of these production
functions in such a way that the calibration of the ENTICE-BR model still applies to our
model. Finally, we consider a ￿nite time horizon starting at date t0 = 1990 and ending at
T = t0 + 350.
3 Welfare analysis








subject to constraints (1)-(10). After eliminating the co-state variables, the ￿rst order
conditions reduce to the ￿ve characteristics conditions of Proposition 1 below, which would
hold at each time t.


























©0(Gs)e¡³(s¡t)ds = 0 (12)
g(Tt)QEEBBQB = 1 (13)
































7For the sake of simplicity, the exogenous land use emissions have been omitted. Those emissions are
likely small (see Nordhaus, 2007) and would alter neither our qualitative nor our quantitative results
8Proof. See Appendix A1.
Equation (12) reads as a particular version of the Hotelling rule in this model that takes
into account the carbon accumulation in the atmosphere, the dynamics of temperatures
and their e￿ects on output. We will see later (cf. equation (39) in Proposition 2) that
this equation allows for the computation of the optimal tax on the fossil fuel. Equation
(13) tells that the marginal productivity of speci￿c input QB equals its marginal cost.
The three last equations are ￿Keynes-Ramsey￿ conditions. Equation (14) characterizes
the optimal trade-o￿ between physical capital K and consumption C, as in more standard
growth models. Equation (15) (resp. (16)) characterizes the same kind of optimal trade-o￿
between speci￿c investment into backstop R&D sector, RB (resp. energy R&D sector, RE)
and consumption.
Optimal values are illustrated in Figures 2-6.
[Figures 2-6 here]
4 Decentralized equilibrium
4.1 Behavior of agents
The price of output Yt is normalized to one and PF;t, PB;t, PE;t, wt and rt are, respectively,
the fossil fuel market price, the backstop price, the energy price, the real wage and the real
interest rate on ￿nancial market at time t.
Recall that production of fossil fuels generates some carbon emission ￿ow. The accu-
mulation of carbon in the atmosphere drives the global mean temperature to increase and,
in that way, it induces an environmental damage. This environmental externality should
create a market failure without any corrective policy since the fossil fuel user, i.e. the
energy producer, does not take into account its negative impact on social welfare. That
is why we introduce an environmental policy de￿ned as a tax ¿t on the demand for fossil
fuels.
We have seen above that both R&D sectors produce innovations which are public,
indivisible and in￿nitely durable pieces of knowledge. A basic feature of the present model
is that these innovations are not embodied in private intermediate goods, as it is done
9for instance in the standard models of endogenous growth. Thus, we cannot assume that
the research activity is funded by pro￿ts of monopolies on these goods. Here, we suppose
that research is directly ￿nanced. First, in each research sector, we determine the social
value of an innovation. Since an innovation is a public good, this social value is the sum
of marginal pro￿tabilities of this innovation in all sectors which use it. We know that, if it
is paid to the inventor, it allows to implement the ￿rst best optimum8. But we also know
that, in the real world, only a part of this sum is generally extracted (for instance, Jones
and Williams, 1998, estimate that actual investment in research are at least four times
below that would be socially optimal; on this point, see Popp, 2006-a). Thus, in a second
step, we de￿ne the market value as a percentage of the social value. Basically, the market
value is lower than the social one because the innovator faces observability, information and
excludability problems. However, we can assume that the research sectors are subsidized
in order to reduce the gap between the social and the private values of innovations.
To sum up, there are two types of policy tools in the model (Bosetti et al., 2006, Eden-
hofer et al., 2005 and 2006, Popp, 2006, analyze the implementation of similar tools): an
environmental tax on the resource and two subsidies for the backstop and energy research
sectors.
4.1.1 The fossil resource sector







0 rsdsdt s.t. Ft = F(QF;t;Zt) and _ Zt = Ft:
Static and dynamic ￿rst order conditions are:
(pF;tFQF ¡ 1)e¡
R t
0 rsds + ´tFQF = 0 (17)
pF;tFZe¡
R t
0 rsds + ´tFZ = ¡_ ´t; (18)
together with the transversality condition limt!1 ´tZt = 0. Replacing pF into (18) by the
expression (1=FQF) ¡ ´e
R t
0 rds coming from (17), it comes:






8This result will be proved by Proposition 3 below. In fact, what we call social values are the Lindahl
prices associated with the innovations.





























Remark that, since FZ < 0 by assumption, then ´t · 0, 8t ¸ 0.
4.1.2 The backstop sector





t = pB;tBt ¡ QB;t s.t. Bt = B(QB;t;HB;t): (22)





which determines the inverse demand function for speci￿c investment QB;t at each time t.
4.1.3 The energy sector





t = pE;tEt ¡ µ(pF;t;¿t)Ft ¡ pB;tBt s.t. Et = E(HE;t;Ft;Bt); (24)
where µ(pF;¿) is the price paid by the ￿rm for fossil fuels, including the environmental
















Those conditions determine respectively the inverse demand functions for fossil fuel and
backstop.
9Our results can easily be extended to the case of an ad-valorem tax, i.e. µ(pF;¿) = pF(1+¿). If ¿
u is
the unit tax, then, for the equilibrium fossil resource price pF, the ad-valorem tax is ¿
a = ¿
u=pF.
114.1.4 The R&D sectors
The behaviors of the backstop and energy R&D sectors are analogous so that we will study
a single problem indexing by i, i = fB;Eg, the sector in question. As we have mentioned
above, knowledge is not embodied inside intermediate goods, which implies that it can not
be ￿nanced by the sale of these goods. As in Grimaud and RougØ (2005), we suppose that
it is in fact directly ￿nanced by public funds, the government paying to the innovator an
amount which is equal to a part of the willingness to pay of both sectors using this type
of knowledge, i.e. the R&D sector i and the energy and the backstop sectors. In other
words, the government subsidizes the sectors which buy knowledge10.
Let us consider for instance the energy R&D sector. Each innovation produced by
this sector is used by the sector itself as well as by the energy sector. Thus, at each date







HE;t are the marginal pro￿tabilities of this innovation both in the energy production
sector and in the energy R&D sector, respectively. The social value of this innovation at t




t rxdxds. Assume that only a part °E;t, with 0 < °E;t · 1, 8t ¸ 0,
is paid to the innovator. Then, the instantaneous market value is:















Similarly, the instantaneous social value of an innovation in the backstop R&D sector






HB;t are the marginal pro￿tabilities of an









t rxdxds is the market value, in which vHB;t = °B;t¹ vHB;t, with 0 < °B;t · 1,
8t ¸ 0.
Note that di￿erentiating (28) (and the corresponding equation for VHB;t) with respect







; 8i = fB;Eg; (29)
10This assumption is in fact a simpli￿cation of a more general framework in which ￿rms using knowledge
as input sell their goods on imperfect competitive (e.g. Cournot) markets that allow them to get strictly
positive pro￿ts to buy knowledge (see Grimaud and Tournemaine, 2006).
12which reads as the equality between the rate of return on the ￿nancial market (left hand
side) and the rate of return on the R&D sector (right hand side).
At each time t, the R&D sector i, i = fB;Eg, supplies the ￿ow of innovations _ Hi;t






t = VHi;tHi(Ri;t;Hi;t) ¡ Ri;t: (30)
























; 8i = fB;Eg: (32)
In order to determine the value of an innovation in both research sectors, we have to know
the marginal pro￿tabilities of innovations in the energy and backstop production sectors.























4.1.5 The ￿nal good sector





t = G(Tt)Q(Kt;Et;At;Lt) ¡ PE;tEt ¡ wtLt ¡ (rt + ±)Kt















= 0 ) wt = g(Tt)QL: (37)
134.1.6 The household





subject to the following dynamic constraint:
_ Dt = rDt + wtLt + ¦t ¡ Ct ¡ Ta
t ;
where Dt is the stock of bonds at time t, ¦t represents the total pro￿ts gained in the
economy (including the resource rent) and Ta
t is a lump-sum tax (subsidy free) that allows









Assuming that the government’s budget constraint holds at each time t, then it writes:
Ta
t + ¿tFt = VHB;t _ HB;t + VHE;t _ HE;t:
4.2 Characterization of the decentralized equilibrium
The characteristic equilibrium conditions and the equilibrium price expressions are given
by Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2 For a given triplet of policies f°E;t;°B;t;¿tg
1
t=0, the equilibrium conditions
can be summed up as follows:
·













0 rxdxds = 0 (39)
g(Tt)QEEBBQB = 1 (40)






































14and the equilibrium corresponding prices are:
r¤
t = g(Tt)QK ¡ ± (44)
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Proof. See Appendix A2.
Equations (39)-(43) are related to the quantities QF, QB, I, RB and RE, respectively.
They have to be compared one for one to equations (12)-(16) of Proposition 1 which
characterize the optimum. In particular, by analyzing condition (39) and the optimal
corresponding one (12), we will be able to compute the tax that implements the ￿rst best
optimum (see next section).
Equations (44)-(50) give the equilibrium prices of K, L, F, E, HB and HE, respectively.
A particular equilibrium is associated with a given triplet of policies f°E;t;°B;t;¿tg
1
t=0
and the equation set of Proposition 2 below allows to compute quantities and prices for
this equilibrium. In particular, if the triplet of policy tools is optimal, this set of equations
gives the same quantities than the ones obtained from Proposition 1; moreover it gives the
￿rst best prices.
4.3 The decentralized equilibrium as a single maximization problem
In order to solve numerically the market outcome, we need to transform the decentralized
problem described above into a single maximization program, for computational require-









_ Kt = g(Tt)QfKt;E[HE;t;F(QF;t;Zt);B(QB;t;HB;t)]g ¡ Ct ¡ ±Kt ¡ RE;t ¡ RB;t
¡QF;t ¡ QB;t ¡ ¿tF(QF;t;Zt)
_ Hi;t = °i;tHi(Ri;t;Hi;t); 8i = fB;Eg
_ Zt = F(QF;t;Zt):
The correspondence with the decentralized equilibrium problem is set up by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Solving the program (P0) leads to the same characterizing conditions (39)-
(43) as the decentralized equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A3.
5 Implementation of the optimum and determination of the
optimal policies
Recall that for a given set of corrective policies, a particular equilibrium is characterized by
conditions (39)-(43) of Proposition 2. This equilibrium will be said to be optimal if it satis-
￿es the optimum characterizing conditions (12)-(16) of Proposition 1. By analogy between
these two sets of conditions, we can show that there exists a single triplet f°B;t;°E;t;¿tg
1
t=0
that implements the optimum.
Since conditions (13) and (14) have the same expressions as (40) and (41) respectively,
we only have to compare the three remaining conditions of each proposition. First, by
identi￿cation from (12) and (39) and noting that UCe¡
R t
0 ½ds = UC;0e¡
R t
0 rds from (38), the
level of the additive environmental tax that implements the optimum ￿ referred to as the





































Note that the interpretation of (52) is quite standard. This expression reads as the ratio
between the marginal social cost of climate change ￿ the marginal damage in terms of
16utility coming from the consumption of an additional unit of ￿nal good ￿ and the marginal
utility obtained by consuming this unit, i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between
pollution and consumption. Equivalently, that corresponds to the social cost of one unit
of carbon in terms of ￿nal good.
Next, the correspondence between the equilibrium characterizing condition (42) (resp.
(43)) and the optimum characterizing condition (15) (resp. (16)) is achieved if and only if
°B;t (resp. °E;t) is equal to one. These results are summarized in Proposition 4 below.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium de￿ned in Proposition 2 is optimal if and only if the triplet
of policies f°E;t;°B;t;¿tg
1
t=0 is such that °B;t = °E;t = 1 and ¿t = ¿o
t , 8t ¸ 0.
Such an optimal tax scheme is depicted in Figure 7. Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the
equilibrium price trajectories that implement the ￿rst best optimum.
[Figures 7, 8 and 9 here]
6 conclusion
The present exercise establishes the template of a detailed climate change integrated assess-
ment model, capable of de￿ning the decentralized outcome, i.e. the equilibrium, of a given
climate policy architecture. The obtained results will then be compared to the socially
optimum outcome so as to characterize the e￿ciency of the policy measures, and partic-
ularly the e￿ciency of the R&D funding that have to be devoted to energy technologies.
One of the main features of the model lies in the analytical derivation of the innovation
prices. In our context, those innovations are dedicated to some speci￿c knowledge of the
energy sector. This feature allows the careful analysis of various carbon tax and subsidies
architectures and their impact on economic and environmental variables, which will be the
next step of the paper.
The natural extension of the model will consist in introducing a richer set of climate
mitigation options such as the possibility of capturing and storing the carbon in geological
formation. One might also introduce biofuel energy, the feedstock then encompassing
the features of a renewable resource. The speci￿cities of nuclear energy may also be
17incorporated in our model. The ￿exibility of the tool at hand allows for the modeling
of speci￿c knowledge stocks for each of the energy supply technologies.
Finally, the calibration of this model may require some further adjustment. In this re-
spect, alternative functional forms may be experienced (See Nordhaus’s comment on Stern
review and the accompanying data update ￿ Nordhaus, 2006). Moreover, as suggested by
the IPCC report (IPCC, 2000), a number of plausible scenarios may arise in the future. The
DICE model calibration may be revised so as to match more closely the GDP projections
of other long term studies. In particular, it would be worthwhile analyzing the e￿ects of
a more sustained long term growth. An enhanced world economic growth would turn into
more intensive fossil energy use, at least in the early decades where the renewable energy
does not exhibit su￿cient cost reduction. Besides the increased externality resulting from
more rapid climate change, the modi￿ed economically recoverable resource base may, in
turn, confront us to lower fossil resource availabilities in the long run. The e￿ect on the
fossil fuel prices and the incentive for increased investment in clean energy R&D deserves
some further investigation.
18Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 1




0 ½ds + ¸g(T)QfK;E [HE;F(QF;Z);B(QB;HB)]g
¡¸(C + QF + QB + RE + RB + ±K) + ºEHE(RE;HE) + ºBHB(RB;HB)
+¹G(®F ¡ ³G) + ¹T[©(G) ¡ mT] + ´F:





0 ½ds ¡ ¸ = 0 (53)
@H
@QF
= ¸[g(T)QEEFFQF ¡ 1] + ®¹GFQF + ´FQF = 0 (54)
@H
@QB
= ¸[g(T)QEEBBQB ¡ 1] = 0 (55)
@H
@RB
= ¡¸ + ºBHB
RB = 0 (56)
@H
@RE
= ¡¸ + ºEHE
RE = 0 (57)
@H
@K
= ¸[g(T)QK ¡ ±] = ¡_ ¸ (58)
@H
@HB
= ¸g(T)QEEBBHB + ºBHB
HB = ¡_ ºB (59)
@H
@HE
= ¸g(T)QEEHE + ºEHE
HE = ¡_ ºE (60)
@H
@G
= ¡³¹G + ¹T©0(G) = ¡_ ¹G (61)
@H
@T
= ¸g0(T)Q ¡ m¹T = ¡_ ¹T (62)
@H
@Z
= ¸g(T)QEEFFZ + ®¹GFZ + ´FZ = ¡_ ´ (63)
and the transversality conditions are:
lim
t!1
¸K = 0 (64)
lim
t!1
ºEHE = 0 (65)
lim
t!1
ºBHB = 0 (66)
lim
t!1
¹GG = 0 (67)
lim
t!1
¹TT = 0 (68)
lim
t!1
´Z = 0 (69)
19First, we show how to obtain condition (12), the less evident one. From (54), we have:




where ¸ = UCe¡
R t
0 ½ds from (53). Substituting this expression into (63) and after simpli￿-
cations, we get the following di￿erential equation:






Integrating this expression and using transversality condition (69), provided that limt!1 Zt >









From (53) and (62), we have:
_ ¹T = m¹T ¡ g0(T)QUCe¡
R t
0 ½ds:























Now, let us consider condition (61). Using transversality condition (67), provided that








where ¹T is de￿ned by (71). Finally, condition (12) is equivalent to condition (54) when
replacing ¸, ¹G and ´ by their expressions coming from (53), (72) and (70) respectively,
and dividing each side of the equation by FQF.
Second, the characterizing condition (13) is directly provided by (55). To conclude the







11This later assumption is highly contestable along an in￿nite time horizon since in the very long run (i.e.
as t ! 1), the fossil resource will be exhausted and, by natural regeneration due to the decay function,
the atmosphere will be cleaned up. However, in the ￿nite horizon problem (350 years) that allows us to
simulate results, it is proved that the fossil resource is not entirely exhausted at the terminal date so that
there is a positive stock of carbon left in the atmosphere.
20Then, condition (14) is simply obtained from (58) and (73). Note that this equation reads
as the standard Keynes-Ramsey rule.
Finally, di￿erentiating (56) with respect to time and using (13), (59) and (73), we get
the characterizing condition (15). In the same way, we obtain (16) from (57) and (60),
which concludes the proof.
A2. Proof of proposition 2
The ￿rst characterizing condition (39) is obtained by replacing ´t into (17) by its expression
coming from (20) and by noting that pF;t = pE;tEF ¡ ¿t from (25), where pE;t = g(Tt)QE
from (36). Second, combining (23), (26) and (36) leads to condition (40). Next, using (35)
and (38), we directly get condition (41).

























; 8i = fB;Eg:
We thus obtain the two last characterizing equilibrium conditions (42) and (43) by replac-
ing into this last equation vB
HB and vE
HE by their expressions coming from (34) and (33)
respectively.
A3. Proof of Proposition 3
The Hamiltonian in discounted value of program (P0) writes:
H = U(C)e¡
R t
0 ½sds + ¸g(T)QfK;E[HE;F(QF;Z);B(QB;HB)]g
¡¸[C + RE + RB + QF + QB + ±K + ¿F(QF;Z)]
+ºE°EHE(RE;HE) + ºB°BHB(RB;HB) + ´F(QF;Z)














= ¸[g(T)QEEFFQF ¡ 1 ¡ ¿FQF] + ´FQF = 0 (75)
@H
@QB
= ¸[g(T)QEEBBQB ¡ 1] = 0 (76)
@H
@RB
= ¡¸ + ºB°BHB
RB = 0 (77)
@H
@RE
= ¡¸ + ºE°EHE
RE = 0 (78)
@H
@K
= ¸[g(T)QK ¡ ±] = ¡_ ¸ (79)
@H
@HB
= ¸g(T)QEEBBHB + ºB°BHB
HB = ¡_ ºB (80)
@H
@HE
= ¸g(T)QEEHE + ºE°EHE
HE = ¡_ ºE (81)
@H
@Z
= ¸[g(T)QEEFFZ ¡ ¿FZ] + ´FZ = ¡_ ´ (82)
and the transversality conditions are:
lim
t!1
¸K = 0 (83)
lim
t!1
ºBHB = 0 (84)
lim
t!1
ºEHE = 0 (85)
lim
t!1
´Z = 0 (86)
As in Appendix A.1, we use (75, (82) and (86) to determine ´. It is the same ex-
pression than (70). Next, replacing into (75) ¸ and ´ by their expressions (74) and (70)
respectively, we have the ￿rst characterizing condition (39). Condition (40) is a direct con-
sequence of (76). Condition (41) is obtained from (74) and (79). Finally, di￿erentiating
(77) (resp. (78)) with respect to time and using (74) and (80) (resp. (74) and (81)) imply
the characterizing conditions (42) and (43), respectively.
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24Figure 2: Global mean temperature and atmospheric carbon concentration at the optimum
Figure 3: Global income and energy production at the optimum
25Figure 4: Resource inputs for energy production
Figure 5: Speci￿c investment into energy input production and R&D sectors
Figure 6: Physical capital and knowledge stocks
26Figure 7: Optimal tax on fossil fuel consumption
Figure 8: First best optimal prices of energy, fuel and backstop
Figure 9: First best optimal prices of innovations, real interest rate and wage
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